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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court below entered its Judgment and Order in this matter on April 2? 2007. 
Respondent Hess' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment was denied on November 5, 
2007, rendering the judgment in the matter final. This Court therefore has jurisdiction 
over this matter under Utah Code. Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (2007), Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
10 (2007) and Utah R. App. P. 3(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether Respondent Hess was required under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-
7.16 (2007) to provide proof of employment and/or educational activity during the times 
for which child care expenses were claimed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondent Hess agrees with Petitioner Bennion in 
that "[d]ue to the equitable nature of child support proceedings, [this Court] accord[s] 
substantial deference to the trial court's findings and give[s] it considerable latitude in 
fashioning support orders." Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
Further, this Court "will not disturb a trial court's decision regarding child support unless 
there has been an abuse of discretion." Hill v. HilL 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah App. 1992). 
In order to show abuse of discretion, Petitioner Bennion must "first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the 
viii 
Court below." Utah County v. Butler. 2008 UT 12, «f 11, — P.3d —- (quoting Wilson 
Supply. Inc. v Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, ^21, 54 P.3d 1177). 
ISSUE 2: Whether Petitioner Bennion may gratuitously place insurance coverage 
on the children of the relationship, duplicative of that placed on the children by 
Respondent Hess under mandate of the trial court's Decree of Divorce of May 19, 1998, 
and thereby claim contribution from Hess as a credit against the judgment owed 
Respondent Hess by Petitioner Bennion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Respondent Hess agrees with Petitioner Bennion that 
this Court "will not disturb a trial court's decision regarding child support unless there 
has been an abuse of discretion." Id. In order to show abuse of discretion, Petitioner 
Bennion must "first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the Court below." Butler at f 11, — P.3d — 
(quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, TJ21, 54 P.3d 1177). 
ISSUE 3: Whether the use of the child support guidelines under Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.7 (2007) ("the guidelines") is constitutional. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Should the Court decide to address the challenge, 
"[t]he challenge to the constitutionality of a statute presents a question of law, which the 
appellate court will review for correctness." State v. Weisberg, 2002 UT App 434 at 
114, 62 P.3d 457 (citing Salt Lake City v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah App. 
ix 
1997)). A review for correctness "ced[es] no deference to the [trial] court." Moss v. 
Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Common. 2007 UT 99 at ^8, 175 P.3d 1042 (citing Oakwood 
Vill. LLC v. Albertsons. Inc.. 2004 UT 101 at T[9, 104 P.3d 1226). 
ISSUE 4: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to make findings 
on the factors listed in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3)(2007) in making its modification 
decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In order to show abuse of discretion, Petitioner 
Bennion must "'first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when 
viewing it in a light most favorable to the Court below." Butler at ^[11, — P.3d — 
(quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v Fradan Mfg. Corp.. 2002 UT 94, f21, 54 P.3d 1177). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Note about provisions of Utah Code Ann.: All of the relevant provisions have been 
recodified as of February 7, 2008 with the passage of 2008 Utah H.B. 78. However, as 
the recodification has not yet been published and in order to preserve consistency with all 
previous documents filed in this case, we are continuing to cite to the former section 
numbers and divisions. 
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U.S. Constitution Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized 
U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sections 2 through and including 5 of this Amendment appear in full in the 
Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (2007) 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7 (2007) 
The text of this statute appears in full in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (2007) 
The text of this statute appears in full in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) 
The text of this statute appears in full in the Addendum. 
xi 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (2007) 
The text of this statute appears in full in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007) 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the 
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
(2)(a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying 
his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child 
care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may 
suspend making monthly payment of that expense while it is not being incurred, 
without obtaining a modification of the child support order. 
(b)(i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who incurs child 
care expense shall provide written verification of the cost and identity of a child 
care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a provider and 
thereafter on the request of the other parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall notify the 
other parent of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child 
care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring 
child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or 
to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring the 
expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a) 
(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in all cases unless the court 
concludes: 
(a)(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(a)(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively 
decided; or 
(a)(3) The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and 
xn 
record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral 
argument. 
UtahR.App.P. 33 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney 
fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, 
or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is 
one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party 
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own 
motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of the 
appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the 
appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue 
to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such 
damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the 
allegations which form the basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in 
which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The order to 
show cause may be part of the notice of oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court 
shall grant a hearing. 
xm 
Utah R. App. P. 34 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall 
be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is 
reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be 
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal 
case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of Utah or 
an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the state shall be at 
the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. 
The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the 
appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and 
attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs 
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of the 
reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for 
supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for 
filing and docketing the appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Hess agrees with, accepts and incorporates by reference herein the 
Statement of the Case as offered by Petitioner Bennion at Petitioner Bennion's Brief, 
pages 3-4, except to note that the matter before this Court on appeal actually began with 
Respondent Hess' Order to Show Cause issued by the trial court on June 4, 2003. R. at 
113-114. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Hess agrees with, accepts as not inaccurate and incorporates by reference 
the Statement of Facts as offered by Petitioner Bennion at Petitioner Bennion5s Brief, 
pages 4-9. Respondent Hess notes, however, that much of the content of Petitioner 
Bennion's Statement of Facts is irrelevant to the disposition of this matter on appeal, 
such as Petitioner Bennion's repeated noting of his counsel's trial objections to receipts 
offered as exhibits by Respondent Hess. See Petitioner Bennion's Brief, page 6. 
Petitioner Bennion has not appealed the issue of the admissibility of these exhibits. The 
trial judge stated that weight would be given the exhibits as determined pursuant to 
argument. R. 1116 at 23-24, 26, 30. 
Additionally, much of Petitioner Bennion's Statement of Facts only reiterates the 
history of the case or puts his spin on the testimony given at trial. 
The only relevant facts on appeal are simple, straightforward, and support affirming 
the judgment of the trial court. The relevant facts are the following: 
1 
1. Petitioner Bennion and Respondent Hess are the parents of two (2) 
children. Decree of Divorce ("Decree"), R. at 93. 
2. Petitioner Bennion has three (3) additional children from a second 
marriage, not residing in his home. R. at 876. 
3. Petitioner Bennion was required to pay one-half (14) of all reasonable child 
care expenses for the parties' minor children pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Decree. 
Decree, R. at 95. 
4. Respondent Hess was required to maintain health and dental insurance on 
the minor children so long as it was available at a reasonable cost and any premium for 
such insurance coverage for the children was to be shared equally by the parties pursuant 
to paragraph 6 of the Decree. Id. 
5. The children were covered by Respondent Hess with insurance from March 
2002 to May 1, 2005 and from June 29, 2005 to the time of trial. R. at 1025-1027 
(Findings of Facts). 
6. Petitioner Bennion began his duplicative and gratuitous insurance coverage 
of the children in 2004. Id. at 1027 (Findings of Facts). 
7. Beginning June 1, 2002 and continuing to the date of trial, Respondent 
Hess incurred reasonable child care expenses for the children in the amount of 
$18,323.67. R. at 1028 (Findings of Facts). 
2 
8. The trial court found that the "day care expenses paid by Respondent Hess 
were for basic day care only and do not include additional expenses paid by Respondent 
Hess for extra-curricular or optional activities." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Evidence of Child Care Expenses for Contribution from Petitioner Bennion 
was Sufficient and Statutorily Valid. 
Petitioner Bennion was required by the Decree to pay "one-half QA) of all reasonable 
child care expenses incurred while [Respondent Hess was] working or while receiving 
occupational or career-related training." Decree |^4, R. at 95. These requirements track 
the language in Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007). The trial court found that 
Respondent Hess' evidentiary submissions at trial, both in the form of receipts and 
testimony, were sufficient to meet these requirements. R. 1116 at 190-191 (oral decision 
on child care expenses); see generally R. 1116 at 14-89, 172-179 (testimony of 
Respondent Hess). 
Petitioner Bennion claims that Respondent Hess failed to provide adequate written 
verification of her physical activities during the times Respondent Hess claimed child 
care expenses as required under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007). Petitioner 
Bennion5s Brief, pages 9, 11-13. Petitioner Bennion claims the statute mandates written 
evidentiary verification of the claimant's actual physical activity at the times the expenses 
are claimed. This claim is frivolous. A simple perusal of the statute shows there is no 
such requirement. 
3 
II. Petitioner Bennion is Not Entitled to Credit For Gratuitous Duplicate 
Insurance Coverage Provided Extraneous To The Trial Court's Decree. 
Petitioner Bennion claims a credit against the judgment amount the trial court found 
he owes Respondent Hess. Petitioner Bennion's theory is that he is entitled under Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007) to contribution from Respondent Hess for one-half (Vi) 
of the premiums Petitioner Bennion paid for insurance on the children and that this 
amount should stand as a credit against the amount of the judgment he owes Respondent 
Hess. Petitioner Bennion's Brief, pages 14-17. Unfortunately, Petitioner Bennion cites 
the wrong section of the Utah Code. The correct section is §78-45-7.15 (2007). 
The trial court complied with the statutory requirements when it issued the Decree 
and required Respondent Hess to maintain insurance on the children. Respondent Hess 
fulfilled her obligation to do so. Petitioner Bennion's insurance coverage on the parties' 
minor children was a gratuitous gift and he can show no legal right to contribution for 
premiums paid either under the statute or under the Decree. 
In fact, however, Petitioner Bennion's claim is frivolous. The trial judge gave him 
credit for these premiums, even though at trial he introduced no evidence to substantiate 
the amount thereof. Petitioner Bennion is appealing on an issue he already won. 
4 
III. Petitioner Bennion's Claim That Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 Is 
Unconstitutional Is Wildly Unwarranted. 
Petitioner Bennion argues that Utah's child support statutes are unconstitutional on 
their face under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. R. at 
876. Petitioner Bennion may not properly raise his "as applied" challenge here as in the 
trial court he merely challenged the statute on its face. 
While Petitioner Bennion does not even intimate what exactly the protection is to 
which he believes he is entitled through the Fourth Amendment, what is clear is that 
jurisprudence surrounding the Amendment centers around the protection of the 
individual's privacy and dignity from unreasonable governmental intrusion. There has 
been no violation of privacy or dignity here, there has been no search, and there has been 
no seizure within the meaning of the Amendment. The Fourth Amendment cannot offer 
Petitioner Bennion any protection, especially considering that he has not enunciated what 
that protection is, other than to reference the Amendment. 
Petitioner Bennion's claim that Utah's child support statutes violate his equal 
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution faces at least 
five (5) distinct bars which it must overcome. First, statutes enjoy a strong presumption 
of constitutionality. Next, Petitioner Bennion must show that there is a disparate effect 
of the law upon similarly situated individuals. Third, Petitioner Bennion must show by 
way of admissible and admitted evidence that he is affected by the alleged inequity. 
Fourth, Petitioner Bennion must show that there is no other possible means of redress to 
5 
the alleged inequity in the statute other than a declaration of unconstitutionality. Lastly, 
Petitioner Bennion must show that it is impossible to validly apply the questioned statute. 
IV. The Trial Court Was Not Required To Make Findings On The Factors 
Listed In Utah Code Ann. §78-45-70) (2007) In Making Its Modification 
Decision. 
Petitioner Bennion never raised this as an issue on appeal until the filing of his brief. 
Therefore, it should not be addressed by this Court. 
Petitioner Bennion argues in his Brief that the trial court "abused its discretion by 
failing to take into consideration Petitioner Bennion's obligation to support his three (3) 
other children when recalculating the child support." Petitioner Bennion's Brief, pages 
22-23. Petitioner Bennion cites case law and the Utah Code for the proposition that if 
and when the trial court deviates from the guidelines, the trial court must enter findings 
of fact on the eight (8) factors listed in paragraph 3 of §78-45-7. This is not an 
inaccurate characterization; however, it does not avail Petitioner Bennion's position. 
The trial court did not deviate from the guidelines and it was therefore not required to 
enter the findings of fact as asserted by Petitioner Bennion. Further, while Petitioner 
Bennion claims the trial court should have entered findings of facts as to the need for 
deviating from the child support guidelines, the statute neither says nor requires any such 
thing. The trial court complied fully with its statutory mandate and therefore Petitioner 
Bennion's claim fails. 
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V. Petitioner Bennion's Request For Oral Argument Should Be Denied And 
Petitioner Bennion's Appeal Should Be Dismissed As Frivolous. 
Petitioner Bennion's request for oral argument should be denied under Utah R. App. 
P. 29, which allows the Court to make such a ruling on a frivolous appeal, which this is, 
and on an appeal where the record and briefing sufficiently sets out the facts, issues, and 
arguments, which this does. The instant appeal "is not grounded in fact, not warranted 
by existing law, or [not] based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). It is therefore by definition frivolous and ought to 
be dismissed by this Court. 
VI. Respondent Hess Is Entitled To Attorney's Fees And Costs For Defense Of 
Frivolous Appeal. 
Further, because this appeal is frivolous, Respondent Hess is entitled to and hereby 
requests that under Utah R. App. P. 33(a) and (c) this Court award Respondent Hess all 
attorney's fees related to the defense of this appeal and all related and allowable costs in 
the maximum amount under Utah R. App. P. 34. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Evidence Of Child Care Expenses For Contribution From Petitioner 
Bennion Was Sufficient And Statutorily Valid. 
Petitioner Bennion fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
determination and then demonstrate that it is insufficient. Further, the plain language of 
the statute makes it clear that Respondent Hess was not required to provide written 
verification of her work and work-related schooling. Finally, credibility is distinctly the 
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function of the fact finder. In this case, the fact finder ruled that the receipts offered by 
Respondent Hess at trial, in conjunction with Respondent Hess' testimony there were 
sufficient to establish the existence of the claimed expenses and any necessary nexus 
between the expenses and Respondent Hess' contemporaneous activities. The trial court 
therefore acted within its discretion on this issue and its judgment should be affirmed. 
A. Petitioner Bennion Fails To Marshal The Evidence In Support of the Trial 
Court's Award Of Child Care Expenses To Respondent Hess And 
Demonstrate Thereby That It Is Insufficient. 
Petitioner Bennion's challenge to the trial court's factual findings regarding the 
evidence presented in support of Respondent Hess' claim for contribution for child care 
expenses fails because Petitioner Bennion must "first marshal all the evidence in support 
of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the 
finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Utah County 
v. Butler. 2008 UT 12, ^[11, — P.3d —- (quoting Wilson Supply. Inc. v Fradan Mfg. 
Corp.. 2002 UT 94, ^[21, 54 P.3d 1177). 
To accomplish this, a party "may not simply cite to the evidence which supports his 
or her position and hope to prevail." Butler at [^11 (citing Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 
56, Tf9, 144 P.3d 1147). Rather, a party must "construct the evidence supporting the 
adversary's position, and then ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Butler at }^11 
(quoting Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
2007 UT 42,1[17, 164 P.3d 384) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[P]arties that fail 
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to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline . . . to 
review the trial court's factual findings." Butler at ^11 (citing Martinez, 2007 UT 42, 
^19, 164 P.3d 384). Petitioner Bennion's Brief of Appellant is completely bereft of such 
an evidentiary showing as that required under Butler. He only briefly sets forth the 
testimony presented by Respondent Hess. Petitioner Bennion then references the 
objections he lodged to Respondent Hess' exhibits. But he fails completely in identifying 
any flaw in the evidence. He therefore does not meet the burden to incite this Court's 
review of the trial court's factual findings. 
B. Respondent Hess Was Not Required To Provide Written Verification Of 
Work Or Work-Related Schooling. 
Petitioner Bennion claims that §78-45-7.16 required Respondent Hess to provide 
written verification of her work and work-related schooling. A reading of the plain 
language of this statute clearly shows there is no such requirement. The statute is clear 
on its face, and Petitioner Bennion's claim is equally clearly frivolous. 
C. The Trial Court Properly Weighed The Evidence Of Child Care Expenses. 
Exhibits R3 through R6 are sufficient to establish payment by Respondent Hess of 
the child care expenses she incurred. R. 1116 at 20-44 (Identification, offer and 
acceptance of Exhibits R3-R6). Her testimony at trial establishes the connection between 
the receipts presented and what Respondent Hess was doing at the times claimed for 
contribution, subject to the credibility evaluation of the fact finder—in this case, the trial 
judge—whose findings may only be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. For 
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Respondent Hess' testimony see R. 1116 at 20 et seq. (direct examination) and 72 et seq. 
(redirect). Credibility determinations must remain the province of the fact finder at trial 
because that is the only person who has had the chance to witness and evaluate the in-
person testimony. In this case, the trial judge did precisely what he ought to have done. 
At trial, Petitioner Bennion reiterated his argument against allowing Respondent 
Hess' claimed child care expenses, asserting a lack of evidence demonstrative of 
Respondent Hess' activities for the covered times and citing Commissioner T. Patrick 
Casey's recommendations from earlier proceedings in this matter. R. 1116 at 187; 
Commissioner Casey's recommendations see Order, R. 619-623. Judge Glenn K. 
Iwasaki at trial observed that Commissioner Casey had only evidentiary proffers upon 
which to base his recommendation (R. 1116 at 190), while Judge Iwasaki had a full day's 
testimony in addition to the exhibits received (id). Judge Iwasaki further noted that 
Respondent Hess' burden was a preponderance of the evidence (id.) and specifically held 
that the receipts offered were "sufficient along with [Respondent Hess'] testimony." Id. 
This Court looks to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning. In this 
case, the requirements and provisions of the Decree tracked the requirements and 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007). Respondent Hess' actions complied 
with these requirements and the evidence offered at trial was found by Judge Iwasaki to 
be sufficient. Petitioner Bennion has failed to present evidence sufficient to counter 
Judge Iwasaki's decision at trial. The trial court clearly used the correct evaluative 
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standard and acted wholly within its discretion in weighing Respondent Hess' evidence 
and charging child care expenses to Petitioner Bennion. For these reasons, the trial 
court's ruling on this issue should be affirmed. 
II. Petitioner Bennion is Not Entitled to Credit For Gratuitous Duplicate 
Insurance Coverage Provided Extraneous To The Trial Court's Decree. 
Petitioner Bennion claims a credit against the judgment amount the trial court found 
he owes Respondent Hess. Petitioner Bennion's Brief, pages 14-17. Petitioner 
Bennion's theory is that he is entitled under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.16 (2007) to 
contribution from Respondent Hess for half of the premiums Petitioner Bennion paid for 
insurance on the children and that this amount should stand as a credit against the amount 
of the judgment he owes Respondent Hess. Id Unfortunately, Petitioner Bennion cites 
the wrong section of the Utah Code. The correct section is §78-45-7.15 (2007). 
Petitioner Bennion's claim fails, however, for two (2) reasons: He can show no legal 
right to such an entitlement under the statute or Decree; and, even though he has no such 
legal right, he has already received exactly the offset he is claiming. This Court should 
deny Petitioner Bennion's claim for any further credit for insurance premiums paid. 
A. Petitioner Bennion Has No Legal Right To A Credit For Premiums Paid 
For Gratuitously Provided And Duplicative Insurance Premiums. 
Section 78-45-7.15 (2007) requires the trial court to assign responsibility for 
covering the children with insurance and provides for contribution of one-half (Vi) of the 
premiums paid from the non-coverage-providing parent to the coverage-providing 
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parent. The trial court complied with the statutory requirements, drafting the Decree in 
conforming terms. See supra 1fl[4-5, Decree %6 R. at 95. Respondent Hess at all relevant 
times fulfilled her obligations under the decree and under the correlating statute and has 
not received the contribution to which she has a full legal right. 
Petitioner Bennion gratuitously covered the children with a duplicative insurance 
plan. "Gratuitous: Done or performed without obligation to do so; given without 
consideration in circumstances that do not otherwise impose a duty.5' Black's Law 
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (entry for "gratuitous" in Black's Law Dictionary Digital at 
http://www.westlaw.com). A gratuitous gift cannot and may not create a binding 
obligation in the donee. Petitioner Bennion may not, therefore, claim credit by virtue of 
the insurance with which he gratuitously covered the children as against the judgment he 
owes Respondent Hess. There exists no such provision in the Utah Code Ann. and 
Petitioner Bennion is not entitled to rewrite the Code to suit his preferred approach to the 
issue of insurance coverage for the parties' minor children. Subparagraphs (1) and (2) of 
§78-45-7.16 (2007) require, respectively, that the court order that insurance be 
maintained if available at a reasonable cost, and then sets forth the factors to consider in 
determining which parent shall maintain such insurance. Then subparagraph (3), in light 
of the determination made under subparagraphs (1) and (2), provides for a sharing of the 
premium paid by a spouse for that insurance. It clearly makes no provision for a parent, 
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on his or her own, to obtain such insurance and claim a contribution therefore, and 
Petitioner Bennion cannot write that into this statute. 
Nor can the two (2) sentences of paragraph 6 of the Decree be read separately. 
Because there is no reference in the Decree to Petitioner Bennion having either the 
obligation or the right to provide insurance, the contribution toward premiums referred to 
in the second sentence clearly refers only to the insurance coverage required in the first 
sentence to be provided by Respondent Hess. 
B. Petitioner Bennion Has Already Received The Offset He Claims. 
Further, despite the fact that Petitioner Bennion has no legal right to a credit for his 
premiums paid and despite the fact that he introduced no evidence at trial to establish 
how much he had paid in premiums (R. 1116 at 129-133, 177-179 and 197-198), the trial 
court nonetheless gave Petitioner Bennion credit for premiums paid by offsetting 
completely all premiums paid by Respondent Hess from 2004, the start date of the double 
coverage, to the time of trial. R. 1116 at 196-201 (argument and findings by court on 
insurance issues). 
In deciding the issue of division and reimbursement of paid insurance premiums for 
the parties' minor children, the trial court calculated the total cost of that insurance as 
paid by Respondent Hess for ten (10) months in 2002 and the year 2003, divided that 
amount by two (2), and charged Petitioner Bennion with the resulting one-half (Vi) of the 
determined total. R. 1116 at 196-201. This division was exactly in accord with the 
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mandate of both Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 and the Decree. Petitioner Bennion, for 
having gratuitously paid premiums in an unknown amount for duplicative insurance 
coverage of the parties' minor children, was given a complete offset against Respondent 
Hess' premiums paid for 2004 to the date of trial. Id. at 201. Thus, although Petitioner 
Bennion had no legal right thereto, he has already won on this issue and has received the 
offset he claims. 
Because Petitioner Bennion has no legal right to an offset for gratuitously paid 
insurance premiums for the parties' minor children and because he has already received 
just such an offset, Petitioner Bennion's claim therefore should be denied and should be 
deemed frivolous. 
III. Petitioner Bennion's Claim That Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) is 
Unconstitutional is Wildly Unwarranted. 
Petitioner Bennion claims Utah's child support statutes are unconstitutional. As 
support for this, he conclusorily states that it is so under the Fourth and Fourteenth 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Petitioner Bennion's Brief, pages 17-22. 
However, his only claim in the trial court was that the statute was unconstitutional on its 
face. He therefore may not now assert that the statute is unconstitutional as applied. 
A. Petitioner Bennion's Fourth Amendment Argument Under The U.S. 
Constitution Utterly Fails. 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bears the title "Searches and 
Seizures." The amendment reads as follows: 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
U.S. Constitution Amendment IV. Textually, the "seizure" language is inseparable from 
the "search," "warrant," and "probable cause" language. It stands to reason that with 
83,568 citations as of February 27, 2008 (West KeyCite run February 27, 2008), if there 
were an application of Fourth Amendment protection from seizure, which seems to be 
Petitioner Bennion's only possible argument under this amendment (which Respondent 
Hess can only guess at since Petitioner Bennion fails to articulate his argument), without 
a concomitant search, it would have been done by now. 
Moreover, the entire body of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which is not 
insubstantial, stands against the invocation of the Amendment in this case. "The 
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state." 68 Am. 
Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures §5 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 
1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29. 1992. 1 F.3d 87, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 
(LCP) (2d Cir. 1993))). "The right of a person to be free from unreasonable government 
intrusion in his or her home is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." Id, (citing Payton 
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), on remand to 51 
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N.Y.2d 169, 433 N.Y.S.2d 61, 412 N.E.2d 1288 (1980)). Here there is no privacy 
interest at stake, there has been no search, and there has been no seizure within the 
meaning of the amendment. Petitioner Bennion's argument under the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution completely fails. 
B. Petitioner Bennion's Equal Protection Argument Under The Fourteenth 
Amendment Of The U.S. Constitution Also Fails. 
Petitioner Bennion faces several hurdles in order to reach a finding that Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of U.S. 
Constitution Amendment XIV. That he may challenge the statute only facially because 
of his failure to raise his "as applied" claim at the trial court level only steepens yet more 
the grade which Petitioner Bennion must traverse. 
First, Petitioner Bennion's claim faces the presumption of constitutionality enjoyed 
by statutes. Next, Petitioner Bennion must show that there is an actual inequity in the 
effect of the law upon similarly situated individuals. Third, Petitioner Bennion must 
introduce evidence to show that he is affected by the alleged inequity. Fourth, Petitioner 
Bennion must show that his alleged inequity under the statute must not be redressable by 
any means other than a declaration of unconstitutionality. Lastly, Petitioner Bennion 
must show that the statute cannot possibly be applied in a valid manner. Because 
Petitioner Bennion cannot meet or overcome any of these bars, the trial court's ruling 
holding Utah's child support statutes constitutional should be affirmed. 
16 
1. Statutes Enjoy Presumption Of Constitutionality. 
Addressing Petitioner Bennion's Motion to find Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) 
unconstitutional, the trial court denied the Motion, referring to the presumption of 
constitutionality normally enjoyed by statutes. R. 1116 at 1-7. Statutes are entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity. See Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847-848 
(Utah 1994). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in In re Estate of Baer. 562 P.2d 614, 
616 (Utah 1977): 
The decisions of this Court unanimously support a presumption of 
constitutionality of legislative enactments. In determining constitutionality, 
statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. It is 
only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional provision that 
they can be declared void. Every reasonable presumption must be indulged in 
and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
Appellate courts "should avoid addressing constitutional issues unless required to do 
so." State ex rel. Z.C.. 2007 UT 54 at j^5, 165 P3.d 1206 (citing Lvon v. Burton, 2000 
UT 19 at \[ 0, 5 P.3d 616). For the reasons explained immediately below, reaching the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) in this case is simply unnecessary 
and therefore this Court ought to abstain therefrom by simply affirming the trial court's 
ruling on the issue. 
2. Petitioner Bennion's Perceived Inequity Does Not Actually Exist. 
Amendment XIV of the U.S. Constitution states in relevant part: "No State shall .. . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In order to 
make an equal protection claim, the plaintiff must show that the government has created 
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classifications among similarly situated individuals, then determine the appropriate level 
of scrutiny, and finally show that the government's reasons for its classifications fail to 
meet that scrutiny. Erwin Chemerinsky, Aspen Treatise Series: Constitutional Law, 
Principles and Policies, 3d ed. 668-674 (Aspen Publishers 2006). 
It is unclear whether Utah's statutory child support scheme creates classifications that 
would qualify for equal protection review. However, even if children are classified as 
either under a support order or not, for purposes of calculating a modification of child 
support, the two (2) classes (which Petitioner Bennion asserts exist) are not necessarily 
treated differently and therefore there cannot be any facial equal protection issues. Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (2007) provides the trial judge with broad equitable discretion in 
matters of child support determination. 
Section 78-45-7 (2007) clearly establishes not only a rebuttability for the guidelines, 
but also a procedure to follow in that rebuttal. The statutory rebuttability of the 
guidelines provides the trial court with further discretion in determination of awards of 
child support. Section 78-45-7.2 (2007) expressly accounts for precisely what Petitioner 
Bennion here claims is a problem of constitutional magnitude. Subsections (6)(a) and 
(7), respectively, explicitly provide for the consideration in the child support calculations 
of children of one (1) party but not in common to both and also specifically allow that 
such children—who are exactly the class to which Petitioner Bennion claims the Utah 
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statutes deny equal protection—may be considered as mitigative towards any potential 
increase in an existing support order. 
3. Petitioner Bennion Failed To Introduce Any Evidence To Show Any 
Additional Child Support Obligations That Would Be Unconstitutionally 
Impaired By The Trial Court's Ruling On The Constitutional Validity Of 
Utah's Child Support Statutes. 
Petitioner Bennion makes much of his testimony at trial informing the trial court of 
Petitioner Bennion's support obligations "under court orders in another matter." 
Petitioner Bennion's Brief, page 21. Petitioner Bennion baldly asserts that the trial court 
"failed to take into consideration the fact that Petitioner Bennion has three (3) other 
children for which he must provide support." Id. In reality, Petitioner Bennion did not 
testify of any support obligations for any additional children. Petitioner Bennion's 
testimony at trial as to his support obligations under court order in another matter 
established that he was responsible for paying for a house and its utilities, the 
automobiles of that marriage, and continuing to maintain health and dental insurance. R. 
1116 at 147. No evidence by way of exhibit was introduced to establish Petitioner 
Bennion's claim of an additional support obligation for three (3) other children. See 
Exhibits Index, attached to Exhibits Envelope as part of Record; see also generally R. 
1116. 
In light of the requirements noted above from the Butler case, supra at 8-9, that the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in the case, construct the prevailing party's 
result from the evidence and then point out the fatal flaws therein, Petitioner Bennion's 
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argument falls far short of the required detail and specificity. Petitioner Bennion has 
attempted to "simply cite to the evidence which supports his or her position and hope[s] 
to prevail," an argument conclusory at best and explicitly barred by Butler's 
jurisprudence, most especially considering that there is no record evidence to which 
Petitioner Bennion may refer in support of his claim. 
4. Petitioner Bennion's Perceived Inequity Addressable Through Means 
Other Than Declaration Of Unconstitutionality Of Statute. 
"A law should be held in violation of the constitution only when necessary to do so 
in granting a constitutional right to an aggrieved party. If it is possible to redress the 
wrong by means other than a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute, the statute 
should not be stricken down." Goodsell v. Dep't of Bus. Regulation, 523 P.2d 1230, 
1232 (Utah 1974) (citing 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §16). In this case, because there 
is no wrong being effected by the statute, the situation as is is redressable "by means 
other than a declaration of the unconstitutionality of [the] statute," (Goodsell 523 P.2d at 
1232), and therefore "the statute should not be stricken down." Id. In this case, because 
there is no inequity, the situation may be appropriately addressed simply by application 
of the statute. The trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of the statute should 
therefore be affirmed. 
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5. Petitioner Bennion Cannot Show That Utah's Child Support Statutes 
Cannot Possibly Be Applied In A Valid Manner. 
In order to successfully challenge a statute as facially unconstitutional, Petitioner 
Bennion must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the challenged 
statute could be applied in a valid manner. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 
107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). This Petitioner Bennion utterly fails 
to do and so his facial challenge to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) fails. Sections 
"2" and "4", immediately supra, combine to demand this result. 
Petitioner Bennion fails to overcome the presumption of statutory constitutionality, 
fails to show an actually extant inequity, failed to introduce any evidence establishing his 
claimed other child support obligation, failed to show that there is no other remedy to his 
alleged inequity available other than a finding of unconstitutionality, and fails to show 
that Utah's child support statutes cannot possibly be applied validly. His claim of 
unconstitutionality under the equal protection clause of U.S. Constitution Amendment 
XIV as to Utah's child support statutes therefore necessarily fails and the trial court's 
ruling so stating should be affirmed. 
Petitioner Bennion fails to make any valid arguments under either the Fourth or 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that would establish unconstitutionality 
of Utah's child support statutes as Petitioner Bennion has claimed. As such, the trial 
court's ruling on the matter should be affirmed. 
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IV. The Trial Court Was Not Required To Make Findings on The Factors 
Listed In Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3) (7007) In Making Its Modification 
Decision. 
Petitioner Bennion never raised this as an issue on appeal until the filing of his brief. 
It was not set forth in his original docketing statement nor his amended docketing 
statement. It was not identified in his statement of issues on appeal, and there is no 
citation to the record showing where this issue was preserved. Therefore, it should not 
be addressed by this Court. 
Petitioner Bennion argues in his Brief that the trial court "abused its discretion by 
failing to take into consideration Petitioner Bennion5s obligation to support his three (3) 
other children when recalculating the child support." Petitioner Bennion's Brief, pages 
22-23. Petitioner Bennion cites Rehn v. Rehn. 1999 UT App. 41, ^ |16, 974 P.2d 306, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7(3) (2007) and specifically §78-45-7(3)(h) (2007) for the 
proposition that if and when the Court deviates from the guidelines, the Court must enter 
findings of fact on the eight (8) factors listed in paragraph 3 of §78-45-7. While this is 
not an inaccurate characterization of either the holding in Rehn or the statute in question, 
it does not help Petitioner Bennion's position. The trial court did not deviate from the 
guidelines and therefore was not required to enter any such findings of fact. 
Petitioner Bennion also argues that under §78-45-7(3) "[t]he trial court in this matter 
should have taken that [sic] into consideration the information it had before it as 
evidence of a potential need for deviating from the child support guidelines when 
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calculating the child support." Petitioner Bennion's Brief, page 23 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7(3)(h) (2007)). He further asserts the trial court should have entered 
findings of fact as to whether deviation from the guidelines was necessary. This is error 
for the statute neither says nor requires any such thing. 
The trial court did not deviate from the guidelines and was not required to enter the 
findings of fact as asserted by Petitioner Bennion. The trial court complied fully with its 
statutory mandate and therefore Petitioner Bennion's claim fails. 
V. Petitioner Bennion's Request For Oral Argument Should Be Denied And 
Petitioner Bennion's Appeal Should Be Dismissed As Frivolous. 
Petitioner Bennion's request for oral argument should be denied under Utah R. App. 
P. 29, which reads in relevant part: "(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in all 
cases unless the court concludes: (a)(1) The appeal is frivolous; or . . . (a)(3) The facts 
and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional 
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." The facts and legal 
arguments in this case are adequately presented in the briefs and record and this Court's 
decision process could not possibly be aided by oral argument. 
Further, this appeal is frivolous. "[A] frivolous appeal, . . . is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App. P. 33(b). Examining further the 
text of the rule, Respondent Hess notes that this establishes sufficient conditions for a 
finding of frivolity. The disjunctive "or" between the second and third clauses indicates 
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that the three (3) clauses are independent and that a finding that an appeal meets any of 
the three (3) conditions will be sufficient to declare the appeal frivolous. 
The facts in this appeal strongly support the judgment of the trial court, so it is very 
difficult to see how this appeal could be based in fact, as there are no facts in the record 
that justify Petitioner Bennion's positions. As repeatedly demonstrated above, Petitioner 
Bennion's arguments are "not warranted by existing law," and Petitioner Bennion puts 
forth no "good faith arguments to extend, modify or reverse existing law." Id. Petitioner 
Bennion's appeal therefore meets every condition of the disjunctive standard necessary 
for a finding of frivolity and, indeed, it strains the imagination to conjure a more 
adequate picture of frivolity than that presented the Court in this appeal. Because the 
appeal is frivolous, it should be dismissed by this Court. 
VI. Respondent Hess Is Entitled To Attorney's Fees And Costs For Defense Of 
Frivolous Appeal. 
Moreover, because this appeal is frivolous, Respondent Hess is entitled to and hereby 
requests that under Utah R. App. P. 33(a) and (c)(1) this Court award Respondent Hess 
all attorney's fees related to the defense of this appeal and all related and allowable costs 
in the maximum amount under Utah R. App. P. 34. Utah. R. App. P. 33 is titled 
Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal; Recovery of Attorney's Fees and section (a) 
provides that: 
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Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a 
motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined 
in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
It is the case that this Rule provides that damages may be awarded for costs and/or fees. 
Due to the rampant degree of frivolity involved in this appeal, Respondent Hess should 
be entitled to both costs and reasonable attorney's fees for the defense of the matter. 
Section (c)(1) provides that fees may be assessed on motion of the party and when that is 
the case, the appellee's brief is an appropriate filing in which to do so. Utah R. App. P. 
34(a) provides that in the case of dismissal of the appeal, "costs shall be taxed against the 
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the c o u r t . . . " Utah R. 
App. P. 34(c) further provides taxability in favor of the prevailing party on appeal of 
"Costs of Briefs and Attachments, Record, Bonds and Other Expenses on Appeal". 
Because this appeal is very ripe for dismissal and is severely frivolous, it is proper 
that the Court award Respondent Hess both reasonable attorney's fees and costs under 
Utah. R. App. P. 33(a), 34(a) and (c). 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Respondent Hess respectfully submits that this 
Court affirm the Judgment in this matter, award attorney's fees and costs as requested, 
and grant such further relief as this Court deems appropriate. 
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DATED this 17th day of March, 2008. 
TJAVIDR. WARD \ 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the 17th day of March, 2008,1 hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Thompson 
881 South Orem Blvd., Suite 1 
Orem, UT 84058 
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B. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7 (2007) 
C. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (2007) 
D. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) 
E. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (2007) 
F. Decree of Divorce 
G. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
H. Judgment and Order 




U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being 
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such 
State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may 
by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United 
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Addendum "B" 
Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7 (2007) 
(l)(a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court order 
unless there has been a substantial change of circumstance on the part of the obligor 
or obligee or adjustment under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the automatic 
adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support shall be the amount as 
stated in the order, without a showing of a material change of circumstances, if the 
stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child support award 
required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's voluntary 
reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has occurred, 
or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been filed, the 
court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a 
proposed award of child support using the guidelines before an order awarding child 
support or modifying an existing award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court shall 
establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the ability7 of an incapacitated adult child to earn, or other benefits received by the 
adult child or on the adult child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; 
(f) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(g) the ages of the parties; and 
(h) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
Addendum "C 
Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.2 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2 (2007) 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or 
modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2)(a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in 
establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support. 
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by 
the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the guidelines, 
and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed to be 
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that 
complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount resulting 
from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest 
of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case. If an 
order rebuts the presumption through findings, it is considered a deviated order. 
(4) The following shall be considered deviations from the guidelines, if: 
(a) the order includes a written finding that it is a deviation from the guidelines; 
(b) the guidelines worksheet has: 
(i) the box checked for a deviation; and 
(ii) an explanation as to the reason; or 
(c) the deviation is made because there were more children than provided for in the 
guidelines table. 
(5) If the amount in the order and the amount on the guidelines worksheet differ by 
$10 or more: 
(a) the order is considered deviated; and 
(b) the incomes listed on the worksheet may not be used in adjusting support for 
emancipation. 
(6)(a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that 
parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the option of either 
party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting or modifying a child 
support award, as provided in Subsection (7). Credit may not be given if: 
(i) by giving credit to the obligor, children for whom a prior support order exists 
would have their child support reduced; or 
(ii) by giving credit to the obligee for a present family, the obligation of the obligor 
would increase. 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the 
respective parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be 
subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the award in the 
instant case. 
(7) In a proceeding to adjust or modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children born after entry of the order and who are not in common to both 
parties may be applied to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied: 
(a) for the benefit of the obligee if the credit would increase the support obligation of 
the obligor from the most recent order; or 
(b) for the benefit of the obligor if the amount of support received by the obligee 
would be decreased from the most recent order. 
(8)(a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the previous 
three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may move the court to adjust the 
amount of a child support order. 
(b) Upon receiving a motion under Subsection (8)(a), the court shall, taking into 
account the best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether there is a difference between the payor's ordered support 
amount and the payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; 
and 
(ii) if there is a difference as described in Subsection (8)(b)(i), adjust the payor's 
ordered support amount to the payor's support amount provided in the guidelines if: 
(A) the difference is 10% or more; 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature; and 
(C) the order adjusting the payor's ordered support amount does not deviate from the 
guidelines. 
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary for an 
adjustment under this Subsection (8). 
(9)(a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to 
adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. A change in the base combined child support obligation table set forth 
in Section 78-45-7.14 is not a substantial change in circumstances for the purposes of 
this Subsection (9). 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (9), a substantial change in circumstances may 
include: 
(i) material changes in custody; 
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties; 
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent; 
(iv) material changes in the employment potential and ability of a parent to earn; 
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; or 
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent for the support of 
others. 
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into 
account the best interests of the child: 
(i) determine whether a substantial change has occurred; 
(ii) if a substantial change has occurred, determine whether the change results in a 
difference of 15% or more between the payor's ordered support amount and the 
payor's support amount that would be required under the guidelines; and 
(iii) adjust the payor's ordered support amount to that which is provided for in the 
guidelines if: 
(A) there is a difference of 15% or more; and 
(B) the difference is not of a temporary nature. 
(10) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (8) and (9) 
shall be included in each child support order . 
Addendum "D" 
Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.7 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.7 (2007) 
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their 
adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is applicable. Except during 
periods of court-ordered parent-time as set forth in Section 78-45-7.11, the parents 
are obligated to pay their proportionate shares of the base combined child support 
obligation. If physical custody of the child changes from that assumed in the original 
order, modification of the order is not necessary, even if only one parent is 
specifically ordered to pay in the order. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in Section 
78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less 
monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as follows: 
(a) combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base 
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation 
table; and 
(b) calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support 
obligation by multiplying the combined child support obligation by each parent's 
percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In the case of an incapacitated adult child, any amount that the incapacitated adult 
child can contribute to the incapacitated adult child's support may be considered in 
the determination of child support and may be used to justify a reduction in the 
amount of support ordered, except that in the case of orders involving multiple 
children, the reduction shall not be greater than the effect of reducing the total 
number of children by one in the child support table calculation. 
(4) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of either parent is between 
$650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of the amount 
calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount calculated using the 
low income table. If the income and number of children is found in an area of the 
low income table in which no amount is shown, the base combined child support 
obligation table is to be used. 
(5) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child 
support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children, additional 
amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted 
by Subsection 78-45-7.2 (3), the amount ordered shall not be less than the amount 
which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(6) If the monthly adjusted gross income of either parent is $649 or less, the tribunal 
shall determine the amount of the child support obligation on a case-by-case basis, 
but the base child support award may not be less than $30. 
(7) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of 
children, not an amount per child. 
(8) For all worksheets, income and support award figures shall be rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
Addendum "E" 
Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.15 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.15 (2007) 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor 
children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical 
expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the 
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance. 
(4) The parent who provides the insurance coverage may receive credit against the 
base child support award or recover the other parent's share of the children's portion 
of the premium. In cases in which the parent does not have insurance but another 
member of the parent's household provides insurance coverage for the children, the 
parent may receive credit against the base child support award or recover the other 
parent's share of the children's portion of the premium. 
(5) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium 
actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing 
the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy and 
multiplying the result by the number of children in the instant case. 
(6) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary 
uninsured medical expenses incurred for the dependent children, including but not 
limited to deductibles and copayments. 
(7) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to 
the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent 
children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of each calendar year. The parent shall 
notify the other parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date the parent first knew 
or should have known of the change. 
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the 
cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment. 
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring 
medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with 
Subsections (7) and (8). 
Addendum "F" 
Decree of Divorce 
mm DISTRICT mum 
Third Jyd i 0 j a / OiStrict 
David R. Ward #3379 
HUTCHISON, NEIDER, WARD & KING 
Attorney for Respondent 
5242 South College Dr., Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 268-9868 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




CHRISTINE BENNION, ] 
Respondent. ] 
DECREE OP DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 964903735 DA 
) Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Honorable 
Glenn Iwasaki, Judge of the above-entitled Court, for entry of a 
Decree of Divorce, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law herein and with good cause appearing 
therefor, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff is granted a Decree of Divorce from the 
Defendant, the same to become final upon the signing and entry 
hereof. 
2. Respondent is awarded the sole care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor children, Aurora Bennion, born January 4, 
1994, and Adria Bennion, born July 29, 1995, subject to, unless 
O^L yCteft 
otherwise agreed by the parties, reasonable visitation rights for 
the Petitioner as the parties may agree, including, but not limited 
to, the following: 
a. Three (3) two-week periods each year. Each party 
shall pay one-half of the cost to transport the children to 
Salt Lake City and back. The parties shall coordinate their 
schedules to accommodate these visits, and Plaintiff shall 
give Respondent at least a 3 0-day prior notice. 
b. Petitioner shall have visitation in California upon 
a 3 0-day prior notice to Respondent, or shorter notice if 
reasonable, so long as this does not interfere with plans that 
Respondent already has. 
3. Petitioner is required to pay child support to Respondent 
in the amount of $352.00 per month, continuing until the minor 
children reach the age of 18 or graduate from high school with 
their normal graduating class, whichever is later. Petitioner's 
income shall not be subject to income withholding pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 78-45-7 et seg. and 62A-11-401 et seg. and 501 et seq 
unless he becomes more than 3 0 days delinquent in his support 
obligation. If automatic withholding does occur, an additional 
$7.00 check processing fee should be included in the amount 
withheld each month. 
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4. Commencing April 1, 1998, Petitioner is required to pay 
one-half (h) of all reasonable child care expenses incurred while 
working or while receiving occupational or career-related training. 
Respondent shall provide to Petitioner written verification of the 
cost and identity of a child care provider upon the initial 
engagement of the provider. 
5. The Respondent shall be allowed to claim the minor 
children as dependents for tax purposes. 
6. Respondent shall be required to maintain health and 
dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so long as 
the same is available at a reasonable cost through her employment. 
Commencing April 1, 1998, any premium for insurance coverage for 
the children and all of the children's medical and dental expenses 
not paid by insurance shall be shared equally by the parties. 
7. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, Respondent shall 
be required to provide verification of insurance coverage to the 
Petitioner or to the Office of Recovery Services, if applicable, on 
or before January 2nd of each calendar year; furthermore, 
Respondent shall be required to notify the Petitioner or the Office 
of Recovery Services, if applicable, of any change of insurance 
carrier, premium or benefits within thirty (30) days of the date 
Respondent first knew or should have known of the change. 
8. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-45-7.15, either party who 
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incurs medical expenses on behalf of the minor children shall be 
required to provide written verification of the costs and payment 
of such medical expenses to the other party within thirty (30) days 
of payment. 
9. Neither party is required to pay alimony herein. 
10. The parties own certain household furnishings, furniture, 
appliances and personal property, and it is reasonable that each 
party should be awarded any such property which each presently has 
in his or her possession, except that Respondent is also awarded 
the following items: The cedar chest, oak closet (3 pieces) , 
housewares (china, stemware, silverware, cookware) and one-half (h) 
of the collectibles. The collectibles shall be valued and divided 
within ninety (90) days after entry of this Decree of Divorce, 
except that Petitioner shall have the option to keep all the 
collectibles if, within that 90 days, he pays to Respondent the 
value of her one-half (h) share therein. 
11. The parties shall each be ordered to assume and pay the 
debts incurred in their own names since the separation, and hold 
the other harmless therefrom. Further, the Petitioner is required 
to assume and pay the obligations owing to Associates ($2,000) , LDS 
Hospital ($680), Gerald Bennion ($7,100), Stayner Fitzgerald 
($400), Selco ($165) and any debts associated with the floral 
businesses, C & R Floral Wholesale and C & R Creations, owned 
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during the marriage. 
12 . Each party is required to pay their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
13. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other 
such documents as are required to implement: the provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
s> Ju WS607 
DATED t h i s jn -—-flay of M » d b L , 7 l 9 9 8 . 
BY THE COURT: 
A p p r o v e d : 
J u d g e Glenn K. I w a s a k i 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On the /XT ~~ day of March, 1998, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DECREE OP DIVORCE, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7050 Union Park Center, Suite 420 





Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law 
DAVID R . W A R D #3379 
WARD & KING, L.C. 
Attorney for Respondent 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)268-9868 
Facsimile: (801)263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD E. BENNION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CHRISTINE M. HESS f/k/a BENNION, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 964903735 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Patrick Casey 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial before the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 30 day of January, 20O7, the Court having 
heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits admitted herein, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and with good cause appearing therefore, the Court does hereby enter the 
following: 
n
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Bennion v Hess-Bennion (Findings of f acts and Conclusions of Law) final wpd 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner was required to pay 
child support to Respondent in the amount of $352.00 per month. This child support amount was 
based on income for the Petitioner of $1,250.00 per month and income for the Respondent of 
$2,288.00 per month. 
2. In November, 1998, Petitioner was elected as a representative to the Utah State 
Legislature and served there through December, 2004. 
3. On January 1, 2001, Petitioner became employed with Salt Lake County. 
4. On December 26, 2003, Respondent filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce 
("Petition") seeking an increase in the child support required to be paid by Petitioner. 
5. A Summons and copy of the Petition were served on the Petitioner on January 17, 
2004. 
6. Since the filing of Respondent's Petition, Petitioner's income has been as follows: 
A. For the year 2004, $54,796.01 ($4,566.00 per month), comprised of the 
following: 
i. Income from the Utah State Legislature: $ 13,509.87. 
ii. Income from Salt Lake County: $42,286.14. 
Petitioner took unpaid leave from Salt Lake County while serving in the State Legislature. 
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B. For the year 2005: $52,896.00 ($4,408.00 per month). 
C. From January 1 to March 31, 2006: $4,618.00 per month. 
D. From April 1, 2006 to the day of trial: $5,537.00 per month. 
7. Since Respondent filed her Petition, she has had the same employer, has worked 
full-time and her income has been as follows: 
A. For 2004: $24,833.32 ($2,089.44 per month). 
B. For 2005: $29,134.31 ($2,427.86 per month). 
C. From January to September 22, 2006: Hourly at the rate of $17.75 per hour 
($3,077.00 per month). 
D. From September 23 to the day of trial: Hourly at the rate of $20.00 per 
hour ($3,467.00 per month). 
8. Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Decree of Divorce, Petitioner was required to pay 
one-half QA) of all reasonable child care expenses for the parties' minor children. 
9. Pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, Respondent was required to 
maintain health and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties, as long as it was 
available at a reasonable cost through her employment, and any premium for such insurance 
coverage for the children and all of the children's medical and dental expenses not paid by 
insurance were to be shared equally by the parties. 
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10. As of June 1, 2002 Petitioner was current on his child support obligation and his 
one-half share of day care expenses and insurance premiums for the parties' children. 
11. Since June 1, 2002 and up to the date of trial, Petitioner's total child support 
obligation pursuant to the Decree of Divorce was $19,712.00, calculated by taking the number of 
months in this period, fifty-six (56) months, and multiplying that by $352.00 per month. 
12. Respondent admitted that Petitioner had paid to her during the period of June 1, 
2002 through the date of trial (January 30, 2007) the total amount of $15,888.00. 
13. Petitioner testified that he sent $400.00 to Respondent just a few days prior to 
trial. 
14. No other evidence was admitted showing any other payment by Petitioner to 
Respondent. 
15. Pursuant to paragraph 2.a. of the Decree of Divorce, each party was required to 
pay one-half of the cost to transport the children to Salt Lake City and back. 
26. Petitioner testified that he paid $1,429.42 in travel expenses for the parties' 
children. 
17. In 2002 and 2003, Respondent's husband, Steve Hess, was employed by New 
Horizons Computer Learning Centers, Inc. 
18. Through her husband's employment, Respondent provided insurance coverage for 
the parties' minor children from March 2002 through May 1, 2005. 
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19. In 2002, this coverage was provided for March through December at a cost of 
$4,164.00, or $416.40 per month, and covered the Respondent, her husband, and the two (2) 
children for a total of four (4) people. The per person cost was $104.10 and the amount 
attributable to the children was $208.20 per month. 
20. In 2002, the insurance premiums paid by Respondent's husband on behalf of the 
minor children totaled $1,457.40, calculated by taking the amount of the premium attributable to 
the children of $208.20 and multiplying that by the seven (7) months of June tlirough December, 
2002. 
21. In 2003, Respondent's husband paid insurance premiums in the amount of 
$4,791.00 or $399.25 per month, and covered the Respondent, her husband and the two (2) 
children for a total of four (4) people. The per person cost was $99.81 per month and the amount 
attributable to the children was $199.62 per month. 
22. No evidence was admitted showing the cost of this insurance to the Petitioner. 
23. In 2004, Respondent's husband paid insurance premiums in the amount of 
$4,304.64 per year or $358.78 per month. The per person cost was $89.68 per month and the 
amount attributable to the children was $179.36 per month. 
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24. From January 1 through May 1, 2005, at which time Respondent's husband was 
laid off from work and his insurance coverage was terminated, Respondent's husband paid 
insurance premiums in the amount o[ $1,672.95 per year or $418.23 per month. The per person 
cost was $104.56 per month and the amount attributable to the parties' children was $209.12 per 
month. 
25. Beginning June 29, 2005 and up to the time of trial (January 30, 2007), 
Respondent obtained a private insurance policy tlirough Blue Cross of California which covered 
the children only. 
26. Respondent obtained this policy because it had no deductibles and only copays, 
cost less than any other comparable policy, and cost only slightly more than a policy which 
required deductibles and paid only eighty percent (80%) of covered expenses. 
28. Respondent has paid insurance premiums from June 29, 2005 up to the time of 
trial (January 30, 2007) as follows: 
A. From July, 2005 through February, 2006, $197.00 per month for a total of 
$1,576.00. 
B. From March, 2006 through January, 2007, $209.00 per month for a total of 
$2,209.00. 
28. Beginning in 2004, Petitioner has provided health insurance coverage for the 
parties' children through the Public Employees Health Program. 
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29. Since June 1, 2002 and up to the date of trial, Respondent has paid day care 
expenses for the parties' minor children in the amount of $18,323.67. 
30. The day care expenses paid by Respondent were for basic day care only and do 
not include additional expenses paid by the Respondent for extra-curricular or optional activities. 
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the Court does hereby enter the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on May 19, 1998. 
2. There had been no modifications of the child support order contained in the 
Decree of Divorce nor any other child support order issued prior to the time of trial. 
3. There had been a substantial change of circumstances in the parties' respective 
incomes at the time Petitioner was served with Respondent's Petition on January 17, 2004. 
4. Petitioner's monthly child support obligation should be modified as of the date of 
trial and Petitioner should be required to pay child support in the amount of $806.42 (as 
computed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45-101 et seq.? a child support worksheet being 
attached hereto as Exhibit UA*' and by this reference incorporated herein). 
5. Petitioner's monthly child support obligation should not be modified retroactively. 
6. Respondent failed to provide evidence as to the payments she admitted that she 
received from Petitioner and is therefore not entitled to judgment against Petitioner for unpaid 
child support as required by the original decree of divorce. 
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7. The day care expenses incurred by the Respondent were reasonable and necessary. 
8. Respondent is entitled to judgment against Petitioner for Petitioner's one-half 
share of day care expenses in the amount of $9,161.83. 
9. The medical insurance premiums incurred by Respondent in 2002 and 2003 were 
reasonable and necessary. 
1.0. Respondent is entitled to judgment against Petitioner for Petitioner's one-half 
share of medical insurance premiums for 2002 in the amount of $723.70 and for 2003 in the 
amount of $1,197.72, for a total of $1,921.42. 
11. Petitioner is entitled to a credit of $714.71 for Respondent's one-half share of 
travel expenses for the children. 
12. The insurance maintained by both parties from 2004 to the time of trial offset and 
Respondent is not entitled to a judgment against Petitioner for one-half of the insurance 
premiums paid for the children during this period of time. 
13. Respondent is entitled to interest at the legal rate often percent (10%) per annum 
on the day care and insurance premium arrears from the date each arrear accrued until the date of 
judgment. 
14. Respondent is entitled to interest on the judgment at the legal rate from the date of 
judgment until paid in full. 
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DATED thi ,2 day of April, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE GLENN K. I^ASAlCI 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the 5lh day of March, 2007,1 hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Thompson 
881 South Orem Blvd., Suite 3 
Orem, UT 84058 
(801) 233-9044 [facsimile] 
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IN THE TPIIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Chad £ Benin on , 
vs 
Christmt Hess fka Christine Bcnnion 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSIOirV AND PATERNITY) j 
Civil No 964903735 
11 Enlei the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for 
whom support is to be awarded 
2a Enter the father's and mother's gross month!) income Refer to 
Instructions foi definition of income 
|2b Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid (Do not enter 
(alimony ordered for this case) 
'2c Entei previously ordered child support (Do not enter obligations ordered 
for the children m Lme 1) 
2d OPTIONAL Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children m Present 
Home Worksheet for either parent 
3 Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a This is the Adjusted Gross Income 
for child support purposes 
4 Take the COMBINED figure m Line 3 and tne number of children in Lme 1 
to the Support Table Find the Base Combined Support Obligation Enter it 
here 
5 Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line A by the COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross m Line 3 
6 Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of 
the Base Support Obligation 
7 BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD Bnng down the amount(s) from Line 
6 or enter the amounts(s) from the Low Income table per U C A 78-45-7 7 
the parent(s) without physical custody of the child(ren) pay(s) the amounl(s) 
all 12 months of the year 
MOTHER FATHER 




$ 3,467 00 






S> 515 58 
$515 58 
61% 
S 806 42 




S 9,004 00 
$ 1.322 00 
IlP^lBHKi 
8 Which parent is the obligor7 ( ) Mother (X) Father ( ) Both 
9 Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in line lt} £K) Yes ( ) No 
If NO, enter the amount(s) ordered $ (Father) S (Mother) and answei numbci 10 
10 What were the reasons stated by the court for the deviation7 
( ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other 




DAVID R. WARD #3379 
WARD & KING, L.C. 
Attorney for Respondent 
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)268-9868 
Facsimile: (801)263-1010 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD E. BENNION, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CHRISTINE M. HESS f/k/a BENNION, 
Respondent. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Case No. 964903735 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Patrick Casey 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial before the Honorable Glenn K. 
Iwasaki, Judge of the above-entitled Court on the 30th day of January, 2007, the Court having 
heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits admitted herein, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, and having made and entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law herein; 
Judgment and Order @J 
HLED DiSTRiCl COURT 
Thud Jncii :oi D'sni^t 
ixrn: •• v 2007 
^ u I l\ / I11\ 
E N ^ F C r 
DATb. 
•pi U rM-i\L 
Bennion v I less-Bennion (ludgmeiit and Order) wpcl j l l l i l l i BlltS IBil Hi l l H i l l H i l l H i l l II 
JD21226293 
964903735 BENNION,CHAD 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Petitioner is required to pay child support to the Respondent commencing January 
31, 2007 in the amount of $814.68 per month. 
2. Respondent is granted judgment against Petitioner as follows: 
a. For Petitioner's one-half share of day care expenses in the amount of 
$9,161.83; 
b. For Petitioner's one-half share of medical insurance premiums incurred by 
the Respondent in 2002 and 2003 for the parties' minor children in the amount of $1,921.42; 
c. Less a credit for Respondent's one-half share of travel expenses for the 
children in the amount of $714.71; 
for a total judgment of $10,368.5# 
3. Respondent is granted judgment against Petitioner for interest at the legal rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum on the day care and insurance premium arrears from the date each 
arrear accrued through the date of entry of this Judgment and Order. 
4. This judgment shall accrue interest at the legal rate until paid in full. 
5. Each party shall pay their own attorney fees and costs incurred herein. 
Bennion v Hess-Bennion (ludgmcnt and Order) wpd Page 2 
DATED this z. day of April, 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE GLENN K. IVv^ASAKI 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On the 5th day of March, 2007,1 hereby certify that I mailed and faxed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael J. Thompson 
881 South Orem Blvd., Suite 3 
Orem, UT 84058 
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Addendum "I" 
Trial Court's Oral 
Decision Following Trial 
1 for - referring to Medicare withholding. Let's see. 
2 I MR. WARD: Your Honor, R17 was never admitted. 
3 That was the one that -
4 THE COURT: Oh, that was the one you withdrew. 
5 MR. WARD: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the 
7 I objection, Mr. Thompson. 
8 MR. THOMPSON: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you. 
10 You have any questions, Mr. Ward? 
11 MR. WARD: No, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 Thank you again, Mr. Bennion. 
14 Anything else? Any other witnesses? Both sides 
15 rest? 
16 MR. WARD: I do. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's go to closing. First 
18 issue, was there a material change - or was there a 
19 substantial change of material circumstances to warrant the 
20 modification of the original divorce decree? That's the 
21 first question I want. 
22 I Mr. Ward? 
23 J MR. WARD: Well, Your Honor, first of all, let me 
24 state that I don't believe that the statute at this point 
25 | requires there be a material change of circumstance in 78-45- | 
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7.2(8). It says, "If a child support order has not been 
issued or modified within the previous three years, a parent, 
3 j legal guardian, or the office - assuming the Office of 
4 Recovery Services - may petition to adjust the amount of the 
5 support order." And then it goes on basically to state that 
6 if there's a difference of 10 percent or more, and it's not 
7 I of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount and 
8 guidelines. 
9 THE COURT: And noting that, plug it in, cause 
10 that's going to be a substantial material change. 
11 MR. WARD: Correct, and, basically, we do have 
12 that. Mr. Bennion testified that, you know, under the 
13 financial declaration that was submitted to the court, he had 
14 based his income at $1,250 per month. Now he's making 
15 $65,000 approximately per year and at the time that we filed, 
16 he was making $42,000 per year during that year. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 MR. WARD: And so I believe that clearly 
19 constitutes a material change of circumstance. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And I guess you can 
21 both address me from counsel table, cause it's going to be -
22 MR. WARD: Okay. 
23 I THE COURT: - quick like that. 
24 I MR. WARD: All right. 
25 | THE COURT: And you contest there's a material 
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1 change of circumstances, and/or you cont st the statutory 
2 authority to make the change if it's more than 10 percent, 
3 and it hasn't been reviewed in tenure. 
4 J MR. THOMPSON: We do contest that, and we also in 
5 our rrial brief, we brought up several cases from around the 
6 country pertaining to material - substantial material change 
7 of circumstances. That income alone is not in and of itself 
8 a substantial material change of circumstances. 
9 Additionally, as pertains to - and we brought this 
10 up earlier, Your Honor, with 30-3-5, which gives the court 
11 complete discretion in this area as to when you're going to 
12 take any modification that the court may deem appropriate. 
13 And court after court that I have been in throughout this 
14 state, does not automatically take it from the time that the 
15 petition was filed. That is up to the court's discretion. 
16 Additionally, with what we brought up with the 
17 three additional children, and, Your Honor, has ruled on 
18 that, but that is our argument, and, of course, we want to 
19 preserve that. 
20 I THE COURT: And it's preserved. 
21 MR. THOMPSON: Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you. 
23 The Court finds that not only is there a 
24 substantial change of material circumstances since the 
25 | initiation of the original divorce decree. I need not reach 
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1 t h a t because the s ta tu to ry authori ty as Mr. Ward indicated 
2 I shows that there hasn ' t been a modification in t h i s matter, 
3 and there i s a 10 percent difference in income. So i t will 
4 I be adjusted. 
5 Second question now that that's done, what income 
6 ! do T attribute to petition? What income do I attribute to 
7 respondent, Mr. Ward, for the purpose of setting. 
8 MR. WARD: For the petitioner, we've introduced the 
9 - we introduced her W-2 forms 2004. And so for 2004, we 
10 would state that her income should be set at $24,833. 
11 THE COURT: Excuse me, R2? 
12 MR. WARD: R2, yes. 
13 THE COURT: Wasn't her testimony that she's making 
14 $3,467 a month? 
15 MR. WARD: Well, I don't recall her testimony, but 
16 what I - I don't recall having her do that. We took the -
17 I'm trying to recall where that - Your Honor, honestly, I 
18 don't have a recollection of that figure. What we did do, is 
19 we had her identify these documents as her W-2 forms, and 
20 stated that these are the amounts that she earned during 
21 2004, 2005, and 2006. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. Her W-2, wage, and tax statement 
23 of 2006 indicates $35,015 a year. 
24 I MR. WARD: Right, right. 
25 | THE COURT: I mean, and you've cited to me at 
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1 $21,000 figure. 
2 | MR. WARD: Well, I apologize. I apologize, Your 
Honor. We're dealing with a modification. So you're looking 
4 - going - well, okay, let me back up just a little b_i t if I 
5 I could. We're asking that the modification be retroactive 
6 back to 2004, and so I'm trying to address what amounts 
7 | should be used for those periods of time, -
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 I MR. WARD: - and so that's what I'm saying. For 
10 I the year 2004, we use -
11 THE COURT: Oh, now, I see what you're talking 
12 about. Okay, and let me make a preemptive ruling then. 
13 Noting the arguments of both sides, the Court will do the 
14 modification from date of trial forward, respectfully denying 
15 your application to do a back at 2004 to the date of entry. 
16 So I want now her current income so we can establish ongoing 
17 child support, and that was why I reached the figure of 
18 $3,467 a month at approximately $41,060 a year. You differ 
19 with that - anything on those amounts? 
20 MR. WARD: Well, let's see. I think that's 
21 j probably based on $20 per hour. I believe -
22 I THE COURT: Exactly. 
23 MR. WARD: - that's where that figure came from. 
24 I THE COURT: Yeah. 
25 i MR. WARD: That's where that came from. 
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1 I THE COURT: And so as I said, Mr. Ward, 
2 respectfully, I'm denying your motion to do an retroactive 
3 | back to the date of filing in 2004. The application will be 
4 I from this date forward. And that being the case, I want 
5 current income so we can establish ongoing child support. So 
6 that was why at £20 an hour, it came out to be $360 - $3,467 
7 a month, and approximately $41,060 a year, and so that would 
8 be the income amount for her. 
9 J MR. WARD: $3,467, yes. 
10 THE COURT: Right. Now, what would be the income 
11 amount that the petitioner - that the plaintiff, Mr. Bennion, 
12 should be assessed? 
13 MR. WARD: It would be $5,537 per month. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. THOMPSON: Yeah, and that's the figure we gave 
16 to you, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Right. And so that would be the - and 
18 you - do you differ from that at all? 
19 MR. THOMPSON: No, that's the figure -
20 THE COURT: Do you differ from my determination as 
21 to her income? 
22 | MR. THOMPSON: No. 
23 | THE COURT: Okay. Those are the incomes? Plug 
24 J them into a child support worksheet, and that's going to be 
25 i the ongoing obligation. 
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1 J MR. THOMPSON: Would you - hers was $30,000 -
2 $35,015? 
3 I THE COURT: No, hers was $3,467 a month. 
4 I MR. THOMPSON: $3,4 67 a month. 
5 I THE COURT: And your client's was $5,000 -
6 MR. THOMPSON: $537. 
7 J THE COURT: Right, a month. 
8 MR. THOMPSON: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. So we have the - do we have the 
10 math there for the ongoing? So that's the modification. 
11 Whatever that - the tables will show, that' s the ongoing 
12 child support. It will be prospective only. 
13 Okay. Let's look at the arrearages on child care 
14 now. Mr. Ward, starting off with your Exhibits 3, 4, 5 and 
15 6. 
16 MR. WARD: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously, the 
17 accounting gets to be sometimes a little bit tedious on this, 
18 but we believe that the accounting we've done is accurate. 
19 The exhibits in R - well, the receipts in Exhibit R3 are the 
20 ones that we're seeking reimbursement for for that period of 
21 time. And we haven't sought reimbursement for the ones where 
22 there is nothing showing on the amount where the top's cut 
23 off. And so we've totaled those up, and as we indicated to 
24 the Court, those total $3,289 being the amount that she 
25 J incurred in child care from the period of June, 2002 through, 
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1 I think, we determined it was like the first week in January 
2 I of 2003. 
3 THE COURT: Very well. 
4 MR. WARD: And then Exhibit R4, what - that showed 
5 the program fees and the sibling discount, but what was 
6 totaled up in that were the program fees payment. And that 
7 exhibit goes through, and you can see those down through 
8 there. The payment - how the payment was made, and the 
9 amount of the payment, and those were totaled up. And -
10 THE COURT: $6,361. 
11 MR. WARD: Well, and maybe just to - maybe a little 
12 too detailed, but they were actually $6,701, but then the 
13 sibling discount was $340. So they netted out to $6,361. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. 
15 MR. WARD: And then there was also the child care 
16 that was provided through Gisler, the ESP -
17 MS. HESS: ESP. 
18 MR. WARD: - care. And again, we did the same 
19 thing. We took the payments. We totaled up the payments as 
20 identified on the exhibit, and those totaled $8,673.67. 
21 THE COURT: So a total of $18,323.67, and if I 
22 grant that, it's divided by two. That would be the 
23 arrearages owed on child care? 
24 J MR. WARD: That's correct. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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1 Mr. Thompson? 
2 I MR. THOMPSON: Yes, Your Honor. Just, basically, 
3 the decree of divorce in this case, specifically in paragraph 
4 4, states reasonable child care expenses are incurred while 
5 J working or while receiving occupational or career reJated 
6 training. That was never provided to us. There's more -
7 also this - the recommendation of Commissioner Casey that, 
8 Your Honor, signed actually, September 21sl of this year, 
9 which states the same thing. The evidence isn't there. So 
10 the commissioner can certify that and say, because 
11 specifically those same things. There's no evidence that any 
12 of it was work related or occupationally related. The only 
13 thing we heard, Your Honor, is that I say I went to school, 
14 and I say I worked. There's no documentation or correlation 
15 between the hours of work and the hours of children. I 
16 couldn't even know for sure what hours Mrs. Hess worked or 
17 what hours the children were in child care. That needed to 
18 be provided. They had notice of that. They had notice of it 
19 on our pretrial disclosures as well, and our pretrial 
20 settlement that has been filed as an exhibit. We believe 
21 that for those reasons, that that should be denied unless she 
22 J can come up with some evidence to that which I'm sure that my 
23 client would still accept, but it's not in the evidence 
24 ! before the Court. 
25 | THE COURT: What about the notification? Was there 
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1 the requirement that at least he notifies as to the first of 
2 the month as the child care expenses? 
3 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: And if that's not been done, is it your 
5 position, Mr. Thompson, that I then disregard all bonafide, 
6 if I find, receipts, because it didn't comply with the 
7 notification of personal amount? 
8 MR. THOMPSON: Not bonafide receipts, but those 
9 receipts have to correlate to work and education related, and 
10 they do not. We have no evidence on the record at all. And 
11 Commissioner Casey specifically brought that up, and they 
12 still didn't bring any evidence, and they've had two years to 
13 do this - two, three years - approximately three - several 
14 years. How many ever that adds up to. 
15 THE COURT: And I'll allow you the last word on 
16 that, Mr. Ward, cause it's your burden. 
17 MR. WARD: Well, Commissioner Casey's ruling was 
18 back in December of 2003. It only related to what existed at 
19 that time, and his ruling simply reserved for trial the 
20 issues as to the child care arrearages. And so, he didn't 
21 make a ruling that the evidence was sufficient to make 
22 certain surmises, but as Your Honor pointed out at the 
23 beginning, that's all there were. And so I think the 
24 evidence is there, and she should be granted a judgment for 
25 J the arrearages. 
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1 I MR. THOMPSON: And, Your Honor, that's simply not 
2 what the order says. If you read paragraph 3 of the order, 
3 it says much more than that. 
4 j THE COURT: Read it. Go ahead, read it. Put it in 
5 I the record. 
6 MR. THOMPSON: xsWith respect to the daycare, 
7 I Petitioner challenges the adequacy of the receipts and 
8 questions whether the daycare was necessarily related to 
9 either work or occupational training. Again, the 
10 documentation suppled by the Respondent does not allow the 
11 commissioner to resolve this dispute. The amount of the 
12 daycare totaling - to be totaling over $48 0 per month 
13 appears somewhat high for two school-aged children. And 
14 although, respondent, has deducted a specific portion of 
15 daycare which she attributes to other extracurricular 
16 activities, it nevertheless appears that the programs for 
17 which respondent is seeking reimbursement may be more than 
18 ordinary daycare. Government boarding in both the decree of 
19 divorce and the government's statute is not at all clear that 
20 respondent is entitled to reimbursement for more than the 
21 j actual costs providing daycare as required by the [inaudible] 
22 party's work or educational schedule. Therefore, since the 
23 evidence is not sufficient to commit that commissioner find 
24 that the daycare expenses are reasonable and related to 
25 I either work or educational training, the commissioner is 
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1 unable to find that the respondent is entitled to a judgment 
2 I in those amounts." And then it goes into medical insurance 
3 ! premiums. 
4 THE COURT: Right. 
5 MR. THOMPSON: And, Your Honor, it's not our burden 
6 I of proof. It's their burden of proof to prove that it 
7 I exists. 
8 THE COURT: I understand, and what was the date of 
9 that recommendation? 
10 MR. THOMPSON: July 2nd of 2003. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you. 
12 That recommendation was authored two and a half 
13 I years ago - no, three and a half years ago, and the court -
14 and the commissioner under what was before him at the time 
15 was doing it on proffer and proffer only. I've had a whole 
16 I day of testimony. I've had sworn testimony in this matter. 
17 The burden is just a preponderance of the evidence. The 
18 Court is convinced from the receipts - in spite of the 
19 argument that the receipts are not legible and sufficient, 
20 the - Ms. Hess has taken off those in which there have been 
21 i no amounts, and so my analysis of three, four, five, and six 
22 would be they are sufficient, along with her testimony to 
23 ! include the reasonable and related daycare expenses. 
24 As to her testimony, and that was her testimony 
25 | that she worked. She - excuse me. She was going to school. 
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She worked while she was going to school. And then as soon 
as she graduated, she did full time employment. That's 
unrebutted, and so the Court accepts it as it is. That whiJe 
there has been questions of that, there is no evidence to the 
contrary other than just bringing up a rebuttal presumption. 
The court finds that it was not rebutted, and based upon six, 
the Court will order that the defendant be liable - excuse me 
- defendant - that Mr. Bennion, who's the petitioner in the 
original action be assessed for arrearages on child care of 
518,323.67 divided by two, $9,000 and change, whatever that 
is. That will be the arrearage figure. 
Now, going back again on the arrearages on child 
support, let's talk about that, Mr. Ward, and Rl says what is 
due, and that shows you $352 a month up until and including 
January of A07. The RIO is what you have indicated as to 
what the payments were. 
My first question to you, Mr. Ward, is what's the 
basis for this summary in RIO? Do we have any deposits? Do 
we have any showing of any payments received that will 
support RIO as a summary? 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, we have - we had Ms. Bennion 
- or Ms. Bennion - Ms. Mess's testimony that this is what she 
received. We don't have - obviously, there's not in evidence 
any copies of checks that were sent by Mr. Bennion or 
anything like that. 
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1 THE COURT: Were any deposits made by her regarding 
2 the alleged amounts that she received that are a basis for 
3 this summary. Isn't that true? 
4 J MR. WARD: That's true. Basically, what RIO is, is 
5 it's an admission by her of what she did receive and if Mr. 
6 Bennion claims to have had anything in addition to that, he 
7 has to put on evidence of what was paid in addition to that. 
8 THE COURT: And so the total of RIO would be 
9 $15,888. The total that was supposed to have been due on the 
10 $352 a month is $19,712. So we're talking a difference of 
11 $3,500, something of that neighborhood? Is that approximate? 
12 MR. WARD: That is correct. 
13 THE COURT: And that would be your alleged 
14 arrearages? 
15 MR. WARD: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: But again, other than her testimony -
17 and this is document driven, because it's - it would be - I 
18 know I made a ruling as to her testimony as to her work 
19 related expenses, and the fact that she was working, which 
20 J was unrebutted, but what do you have in support, again, other 
21 than her testimony that this is the amounts that she 
22 received? 
23 MR. WARD: What we have in evidence, Your Honor, is 
24 j her testimony. And again,, I would simply emphasize that, 
25 j you know, this is what she acknowledges. She admits that 
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1 this was paid. She doesn't have any other evidence of 
2 anything being paid beyond that, and she put this - you know, 
3 she stated that she put this summary together. She did it 
4 through - on an Excel spreadsheet Lo show the amounts that 
5 I received, and when they were received, and the amounts paid. 
6 So it's her testimony. 
7 I THE COURT: Well, what was her basis though, even 
8 though she prepared it, and it was on a spreadsheet, what was 
9 her basis to put these numbers on there? What did she look 
10 at? Did she just recollect that in August of 2002 she 
11 received $385, or what was it that she noted to put it down 
12 here? 
13 MR. WARD: I don' t r e c a l l - I guess , I don ' t r eca l l 
14 her exact testimony, but I believe she t e s t i f i e d tha t she 
15 c rea ted t h i s spreadsheet from her personal r ecords . Now, 
16 those records have not been admitted into evidence, but 
17 that's -
18 THE COURT: And there in lies the rub. Did she do 
19 by memory that on 11-30-02, he only paid $105? I mean, what 
20 J was the source to create R10 and do I have it in front of me? 
21 MR. WARD: You don't have - other than her 
22 I testimony, you don't have any exhibit in front of you other 
23 I than - well, other than R10 which is based on her testimony 
24 that this is what she received. That's what you have. 
25 i THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Thompson? 
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1 MR. THOMPSON: And that's correct, Your Honor, and 
2 I think we objected to that at that time. Mr. Bennion 
3 I actually didn't bring any of the records to support him 
4 either, but his testimony was that he paid for it. He paid 
5 the child support. So we have someone that says, he didn't, 
6 and someone that says he did. 
7 THE COURT: This issue is different from the child 
8 care because the child care has been supported meticulously 
9 by receipts, by credit card statements included in R3 and R4 
10 as well as the family ledger that was created in R5, and it 
11 goes with particularity as to what was paid, what was 
12 received, what was credited, etc. To say, blanket RIO -
13 although admitted. As I said, the Court gives weight to it. 
14 What weight do I give to it when there's no supporting 
15 documentation to establish that RIO is a true and accurate 
16 summary of child support payments or over payments in this 
17 matter. 
18 I With that in mind, the Court would find that the 
19 evidence is lacking as to any support of RIO. The Court does 
20 not grant any arrearages for past child support in the amount 
21 of - as I said approximately $3,500, because I'm just not 
22 J convinced that there's anything before me to establish the 
authenticity of RIO other than her testimony, which she could 
24 I have provided and the person that could have provided it, has 
25 J the burden of doing that. She could have provided it the 
194 
1 same way that she created RIO. She could have brought in the 
2 same documents to say, this is what I relied upon to create 
3 RIO. That wasn't done. The Court, accordingly, is not going 
4 to grant any arrearages for child support. 
5 Let's look at insurance coverage. Oh, let me get 
6 one thing out of the way first. What about the travel 
7 I expenses? You haven't put on any evidence contrary to the 
8 four entries that he has indicated as to the amount of child 
9 expenses for travel: 2004, $385.40; 2005, $539.80 something, 
10 $439,82, and $450. Do you contest that those were paid as 
11 the travel expenses? 
12 MR. WARD: No. 
13 THE COURT: All right. So -
14 MR. THOMPSON: And those amounts are half and half. 
15 THE COURT: Well, that's right. And so, total that 
16 up, divide it in half. That will be the credit that will -
17 I that Mr. Bennion will get. You can take that credit off any 
18 arrearages as to the child care, which I've given you in 
19 terms of $9,000 something dollars. 
20 Insurance benefits, insurance premiums - now, is it 
21 my understanding that since at least January of 2004, we've 
22 had dual coverage? And the parties, because of whatever 
23 reason, have not accessed the dual coverage? And is that the 
24 stated testimony? 
25 i MR. THOMPSON: Yes. 
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1 I MR. WARD: I think that's what the testimony shows, 
2 J yes. 
3 THE COURT: Okay, all right. So what should be 
4 J your best shot, Mr. Ward, as to what the award, if any, 
5 should be as to medical expenses, and child care, and -
6 excuse me - and the insurance premiums? 
7 MR. WARD: On this, Your Honor, we would be 
8 referring to Exhibits R7, R8, and R9. 
9 THE COURT: R7, R8, and R9? Thank you. 
10 MR. WARD: And R7 shows what was paid in 2002 for 
11 insurance, medical/vision insurance of $3,360 and $804 in 
12 dental insurance. The testimony is it was developed -
13 indicated that the amount was - I guess, the additional 
14 amount for those children in 2002 as I understand our 
15 statute, you take that divided among all four people who were 
16 covered. We acknowledge that. But so for 2 002, - and I 
17 believe the testimony was also that that didn't go into 
18 effect until approximately March of 2002, and so you would 
19 take those two figures together, divide it by 10, and then 
20 multiply it by seven to get the amount that was owed for 
21 2002. And I haven't had a moment yet to actually run that 
22 I calculation, but that's how I would see that calculation 
23 working. 
24 THE COURT: All right, and are you only asking for 
25 2002? Aren't you asking for [inaudible] -
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MR. WARD: [inaudible] 
2 I THE COURT: What about the fact that there appears 
3 to be - at least from the evidence of P18, that the effective 
4 date of the PEHP was 1-01-04. So WJ th that in mind that 
5 there was coverage by Mr. Bennion, at least beginning 1-01-04 
6 where he was paying premiums also. And instead of offsetting 
7 both - I mean, instead of giving half of one and half of the 
8 other, why not just an offset of January of '04 forwards? 
9 MR. WARD: Well, Your Honor, the problem as T think 
10 the evidence that developed was that Mr. Bennion did not - he 
11 didn't do what he needed to do to make that insurance 
12 available. You know, his testimony was that there was a 
13 verbal conversation. My client says, yes, he said he had 
14 insurance, but he didn't provide any information. When the 
15 copy of the policy came through discovery, testimony was they 
16 investigated it. There were significant hurdles in trying IO 
17 use that insurance, and the coverage didn't appear to be as 
18 good. They continued to maintain it. Still Mr. Bennion took 
19 no steps on that to actually try and make that insurance 
20 available, to see that it was used, that it was utilized. 
21 And so, I don't think that there's any reason to say that 
22 that was available to them in California, and so I think 
23 she's entitled to half of the insurance premiums that were 
24 paid for her insurance. 
25 I Now, as far as his insurance, there was no evidence 
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r e g a r d i n g how much he paid in premiums, and so I d o n ' t -
l a c k i n g t h a t , I d o n ' t see t h a t the re could be any o f f s e t from 
what he p rov ided . You know, the fact of t h e m a t t e r too i s , 
t h a t the c h i l d r e n were - I mean, they were f u l l t ime in 
C a l i f o r n i a . Up here p e r i o d i c a l l y for v i s i t a t i o n . But most 
of t he medical ca re i s going to be in C a l i f o r n i a , and so I -
t h e r easonab leness of the a c t i o n s here are I t h i n k a re 
apparen t t h a t she had to mainta in t h a t i n s u r a n c e . She had to 
have t h a t coverage in C a l i f o r n i a . Mr. Benaion was not 
c o o p e r a t i n g . He wasn ' t p rovid ing the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t would 
have made t h a t insurance a v a i l a b l e in C a l i f o r n i a , i f , i n 
f a c t , i t could be used and could be used i n a r e a s o n a b l e 
manner. So based on t h a t , I th ink the premiums need t o be -
premiums t h a t s h e ' s pa id , need to be d i v i d e d . The p o r t i o n s 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the c h i l d r e n needs to be d i v i d e d between the 
p a r t i e s . There i s no evidence on previous p a i d by him, and I 
d o n ' t t h i n k t h a t i t i s app rop r i a t e to j u s t o f f s e t them given 
t h a t t h e y ' r e l i v i n g in d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s , t h e c h i l d r e n l i v i n g 
i n C a l i f o r n i a f u l l t ime, and so t h a t ' s how I t h i n k t h a t ought 
t o be done. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Ward. 
Mr. Thompson? 
MR. THOMPSON: Technically, Your Honor, there's no 
evidence that Mrs. Hess until June 29th, I believe it was in 
2005 paid the insurance for the children herself either. And 
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1 if we look at the decree of divorce, specifically paragraph 
2 6, it says, "Respondent shall be required to maintain health 
3 and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so 
4 long as the same is available at a reasonable cost per their 
5 I employment."' She admits, and Mr. Hess in his testimony when 
6 I asked him that question admitted that he had no 
7 responsibility to do that, but he did it. The decree of 
8 divorce, I believe, is specific. It says, ^If available 
9 through her employment, she provides it." And that's a 
10 little more specific than normal as Mr. Ward prepared this in 
11 the divorce, so they knew at that time. 
12 Now, Your Honor, when you mentioned from the date 
13 of the document that you have, 2004, what Mr. - what they 
14 testified to. Mrs. Hess actually, was verbal conversations 
15 before the discovery, which was in February of 2004. So they 
16 got those documents. Mr. Hess testified that he went through 
17 them in detail, and his testimony was that they basically -
18 that they just chose not to exercise any of that possibility. 
19 THE COURT: I think one of the disappointing parts 
20 of this issue here is that there appeared to have been dual 
21 coverage, and that nobody would have had to pay. It would 
22 have covered a hundred percent of the - any claims that were 
23 being made, but because of the perceived problems that Mr. 
24 Hess testified about upon his investigating into the 
25 J insurance problems and insurance coverage, he didn't even 
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California insurance, and I don't know the coverage of PEHP 
in the same way Mr. Bennion, while speaking more 
authoritatively has not convinced the court that he knows 
anymore as to the coverage of the insurance . But apparently, 
if two people are paying for separate insurance covering the 
same children, it would appear in argument and logic that 
they would cover each other. And if you all don't want to 
work with each other to do that, then I guess you're going to 
have be paying whatever excessive premiums or paying whatever 
claims without medical coverage. But it appears to me that 
since January of x04, there has been coverage by Mr. Bennion 
of the children. That was also the same period that there 
was coverage in California of the children too. I question -
it seems to - my issues on this seem to be for the years 
2002, 2003 where there wasn't, in my opinion, documentation. 
Those are going to be the times that - and I'm - that I'm 
going to grant half of the insurance premiums that were paid 
by Ms. Hess for the coverage of the children, half of which 
to be attributed to Mr. Bennion. Now, what's the number 
going to be, Mr. Ward? 
MR. WARD: Well, I've identified for 2002. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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1 MR. WARD: And for 2003, we have Mr. Hess's final 
2 pay stub for 2003. It shows that the premiums paid were $900 
3 for dental, $3,720 for medical, $171 for vision, and so it 
4 would be one half of those amounts. 
5 THE COURT: And so I'm granting the amounts for 
6 2002, 2003. From 2004 forward where there's been duplicate 
7 and both coverage, in spite of your arguments, Mr. Ward, 
8 there was - there had to be some payment. Although, you're 
9 correct in that - in stating that the amount of payment 
10 hasn't been established, but there has been some payment. 
11 I'm going to offset it as to my equitable powers, and say 
12 that each one of them - or at least the cost of their 
13 insurance coverage - what is - from 2004 forward. In the 
14 order of modification, there ought to be a procedure in which 
15 both of these insurance companies can be accessed. So that 
16 you get a maximum benefit for the children, and I would 
17 expect that in - for the best interest of the children of 
18 your clients, counsel can get together before the final 
19 I drafting of the modification order and put that in there. 
20 That's what I would expect. 
21 So the arrearages as to the medical premiums -
22 medical, dental, and premiums would be as to 2002, 2003, half 
23 of which will be attributed to Mr. Bennion. 
24 What about the dental bill? Minuscule as it is, 
25 I what's your position on that, Mr. Ward? 
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1 MR. WARD: Well, the dental bill doesn't show that 
2 Mr. Bennion even paid anything on that. It appears that 
3 whatever was there was paid by insurance. And so because of 
4 that, there's no need to be reimbursed. 
5 THE COURT: Mr. Thompson? 
6 MR. THOMPSON: You need to point me, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: That's P19. 
8 MR. THOMPSON: Number 19? 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 MR. THOMPSON: Okay, Your Honor, what this shows is 
11 that there was three payments for insurance. One of $84, one 
12 of $71.21, and one of $61, which, obviously, from seeing the 
13 amounts here do not coincide to all the expenses. So what we 
14 would ask is that anything above and beyond the insurance 
15 that is shown to be paid, because at the end, it is zeroed 
16 out, that that be split between the parties . 
17 THE COURT: Well, what's the amount? 
18 MR. THOMPSON: I need to add it up. 
19 THE COURT: Is it worth even adding up? 
20 MR. THOMPSON: My client waives it. 
21 THE COURT: All right, thank you. With that then, 
22 there'll be no reimbursement for the dental cost. You 
23 provide this, Mr. Ward? 
24 COURT CLERK: I need that exhibit back that you 
25 J just [inaudible]. 
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1 THE COURT: Anything more? 
2 I MR. WARD: Well, I guess, I would just indicate 
3 j that both parties have requested attorney fees and costs. 
4 J THE COURT: And looking at the ability to pay and 
5 need is about - it's the same. The Court finds that there be 
6 I no entitlement to attorney's fees. Each one will bear their 
7 j own cost and fees in this matter. 
8 | Do you have enough to draft up a final order, Mr. 
9 Ward? 
10 MR. WARD: I'll give it a shot. 
11 THE COURT: Thank you, and also get together as LO 
12 j find - work out a way that - with thar insurance, it can be 
13 accessed and utilized to the benefit of those children that 
14 you're both paying for, okay? 
15 j There being nothing further, thank you very much. 
16 I appreciate the manner in which it was presented to me. We 
17 saved a day. Thank you, counsel. Thank you parties. Court 
18 in recess. 
19 MR. THOMPSON: I guess that's -
20 COURT CLERK: Court is in recess. All arise, 
21 please. 
22 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
23 I 
24 I 
25 ! -c-
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